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How might a new U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh review federal agency 
statutory interpretations that come before him on the Court? 
To find at least a preliminary answer, we can look to his judicial behavior while serving 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit—and there is plenty of relevant 
Kavanaugh judicial behavior to observe. Since starting his service on the D.C. Circuit in 
2006, Judge Kavanaugh has participated in the disposition of around 2,700 cases and 
has authored more than 300 opinions. Over a third of those authored opinions involved 
administrative law. 
Our recent empirical work provides insight into how Judge Kavanaugh, along with 
many other circuit court judges, review federal agency statutory interpretations. We 
have looked at over 1,600 instances of judicially reviewed statutory interpretations in 
the circuit courts from 2003 to 2013. Just a small fraction of these cases include 
decisions by Judge Kavanaugh. Of the 33 relevant Kavanaugh observations in our data, 
he voted in favor of the agency’s statutory interpretation 25 times. Kavanaugh’s overall 
75 percent rate of support for agencies in these cases was slightly above the overall 
average for all judges in our data at 71 percent. 
Judge Kavanaugh’s deference to agencies rose to over 81 percent when the agency’s 
interpretation was conservative, and it fell to under 71 percent when the agency’s 
interpretation was liberal. In other words, Judge Kavanaugh was somewhat more likely 
to defer to agencies’ interpretations when we would expect those interpretations to align 
with his political preferences. 
Kavanaugh’s voting inclinations in these interpretation cases are not an outlier; rather, 
they line up with the broader trend that we observed across circuit judges of all political 
stripes and are actually less ideologically tinged than those of many other judges in the 
data. 
But if Judge Kavanaugh soon becomes Justice Kavanaugh, are we likely to see the end of 
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council as we know it today? 
Based on his judicial record and academic writings, it seems quite possible we will. 
Judge Kavanaugh has expressed support for “reining in” the Chevron doctrine of 
deference to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory 
provisions. He has said he wants to make it less “indeterminate” and “antithetical to the 
neutral, impartial rule of law.” Kavanaugh has also argued that, although “some may 
conceive of judging more as a partisan or policymaking exercise in which judges should 
or necessarily must bring their policy and philosophical predilections to bear on the text 
at hand,” he believes that the “American rule of law…depends on neutral, impartial 
judges who say what the law is, not what the law should be.” 
As one of us has detailed elsewhere, Judge Kavanaugh’s record suggests at least three 
ways in which he could limit the reach of Chevron deference. First, like Justice Antonin 
Scalia, a Justice Kavanaugh would likely apply all of the textualist tools available to 
eliminate statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Second, he would aggressively 
embrace the major questions doctrine to refuse Chevron deference for any statutory 
ambiguity that raises a question of deep economic or political significance. Third, a 
Justice Kavanaugh may argue against judicial deference with respect to specific 
statutory terms and phrases, preserving deference only for open-ended statutory 
delegations that do not raise major economic or political questions. 
Ironically, if Kavanaugh and his fellow justices successfully reduce Chevron’s domain, 
they may actually create an environment that is much more conducive to judicial 
preferences affecting decisions. Our empirical results for all circuit judges provide 
important nuance about cases decided under Chevron deference versus those decided 
under a standard that is less deferential to the agency: Conservative panels using the 
Chevron doctrine were as much as 25 percent less likely to uphold a liberal agency 
interpretation than liberal panels, and liberal panels applying Chevron were as much as 
23 percent less likely to uphold a conservative agency interpretation than conservative 
panels. 
However, when reviewing panels applied a less deferential standard than Chevron, 
judges’ ideological behavior skyrocketed. Conservative panels were as much as 63 
percent less likely to agree with liberal agency interpretations than liberal panels, and 
liberal panels were as much as 36 percent less likely to agree with conservative agency 
interpretations than conservative panels. (Note that, with only four observations in our 
data where Judge Kavanaugh reviewed an agency statutory interpretation while 
applying a less deferential standard of review than Chevron, it would be unwise to draw 
specific conclusions about his individual behavior in that regard.) 
But Judge Kavanaugh has also argued that Chevron shifts too much power to the 
executive branch by encouraging it “to be extremely aggressive in seeking to squeeze its 
policy goals into ill-fitting statutory authorizations and restraints” and to push “the legal 
envelope.” This may be an area where a Justice Kavanaugh could find support in our 
research. We find that deference levels to agency statutory interpretations, both liberal 
and conservative, increased under Chevron compared to under other standards of 
review. Specifically, we see an average overall agency-win rate of 77 percent when judges 
applied Chevron deference. But that average number fell to just 54 percent when 
Chevron deference was not applied. 
In short, Chevron deference may exacerbate agency overreach, but it may also mitigate 
judges’ ideological decision-making. Yet, on the flip side, Chevron’s absence may limit 
agency overreach, but exacerbate subconscious ideological judicial behavior. The key 
issue for the Court will be how to balance the benefits and costs of Chevron deference or 
other forms of judicial review. 
Whether supported by the data or not, Kavanaugh will likely find support for narrowing 
Chevron from several of his prospective Supreme Court colleagues. Chief Justice John 
Roberts has called for a more context-specific Chevron deference. Justices Samuel Alito 
and Clarence Thomas joined then-Justice Scalia in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers 
Association to question the constitutionality and wisdom of judicial deference to agency 
interpretations of their own regulations. That said, as his dissent in Pereira v. Sessions 
this year hinted, Justice Alito may not be as excited as others to reconsider Chevron 
deference. As a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, now-Justice 
Neil Gorsuch called for less reflexive deference to agency statutory interpretations. 
Justice Thomas has raised similar concerns about Chevron deference. 
The Supreme Court will no doubt continue to assess the scope and strength of Chevron 
deference in the years ahead. As was the case with Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing last 
year, we should expect Chevron deference to be a prominent line of inquiry at 
Kavanaugh’s hearing next week before the Senate Judiciary Committee. And based on 
his judicial record and academic writings to date, we would expect a Justice Kavanaugh 
to contribute significantly in shaping the future of Chevron deference and 
administrative law more generally. 
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